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The doctrine of proprietary estoppel is living in interesting times, having recently had only its 
second substantive consideration by the House of Lords.  In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row 
Management Ltd., their Lordships held that an oral commercial arrangement that is binding in 
honour only cannot usually generate a proprietary estoppel claim.1  Another context in which the 
doctrine has increasingly been applied is the domestic sphere, particularly in cases of 
testamentary promises made orally to unpaid workers.   Writing extra-judicially, Lord Walker 
has recognised the importance of estoppel in providing a remedy in these ‘assistance’ cases.2  
Nevertheless, in spite of the commercial nature of the facts in Cobbe, the wide-ranging remarks 
of their Lordships (particularly Lord Scott) could have serious implications for such domestic 
cases.  Indeed, Ben McFarlane and Andrew Robertson have (perhaps prematurely) contemplated 
the demise of proprietary estoppel as a doctrine in its own right.3  Thorner v Curtis was the last 
domestic case to be decided by the Court of Appeal before Cobbe.4  Thorner itself has recently 
been the subject of an appeal to the House of Lords, and their Lordships’ judgments will be 
eagerly awaited.   
This note will evaluate the Court of Appeal’s decision on its own terms.  The case 
centred on the nature of a relevant representation. This essential requirement for an estoppel 
claim is inevitably problematic in the domestic context, and the matter has some parallels with 
the infamous notion of ‘common intention’ in relation to constructive trusts of the family home.5  
The difficulty is particularly acute when the representor is an elderly and potentially vulnerable 
individual.  Judges are charged with the unenviable task of balancing issues including 
testamentary freedom, capacity, the potential for undue influence and certainty on the one hand, 
with the arguable desirability of enforcing promises made to a long-suffering unpaid worker on 
the other.  In Thorner, the Court of Appeal tightened the requirements for a relevant 





The late Peter Thorner was a Somerset farmer with a ‘strong and proud personality’.6  He was a 
‘man of few words’, a private individual who tended to speak in indirect terms.7  He also disliked 
paperwork and had literacy problems.  In 1976, Peter’s first wife died.  Partly out of a sense of 
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familial obligation, David Thorner, the son of Peter’s cousin Jimmy, stepped in to help at Peter’s 
farm at that time.  As well as helping with the animals, David built fences, worked on farm 
buildings and undertook ‘a great deal’ of the administration and paperwork associated with the 
farm, which was known as Steart Farm.8  At one time, he was working 18-hour days, splitting his 
time between Peter and Jimmy’s farms, and unsurprisingly had little in the way of a social life.  
Health problems eventually prevented Peter from carrying out physical work, and his need for 
assistance therefore increased.  Peter also suffered psychiatric problems during ancillary relief 
proceedings arising from the breakdown of his second marriage, and David cooked meals for 
him several times a week during this period.   
David was not the only person who helped out at Steart Farm, and Peter employed 
workers at various stages.  Nevertheless, Peter expected more from David than he did from any 
of his employees, and there was evidence that the farm would have ceased to trade profitably if it 
had not been for David.  He was never paid for almost 30 years of being ‘at Peter’s beck and 
call’, and he turned down other career opportunities in order to remain in Somerset with Peter 
and his own parents.9 
Peter had made a will in 1997, under which David would have inherited the farm, but that 
will had been revoked a year later.  Whatever the reason for the revocation, and despite warnings 
from his solicitor about the consequences of intestacy, Peter never replaced the 1997 will and he 
died intestate, divorced and childless in 2005.   
David brought a proprietary estoppel claim against Peter’s estate.  He had been hoping to 
inherit the farm since the 1980s and claimed that Peter had made ‘various noises’ causing him to 
believe that he would inherit it, but admitted that ‘nothing very definite’ was said.10  The main 
event on which David based his claim occurred in 1990, and consisted of Peter handing David a 
Bonus Notice relating to two life insurance policies on the former’s life, with the remark: ‘that’s 
for my death duties’.11  David also sought to rely on other indirect remarks, made to him by Peter 
concerning the running of the farm, which he claimed reinforced his expectation that he would 
inherit it.  Finally, he cited things that Peter said to others, which gave the impression that David 
would succeed him.       
 
The first instance decision 
 
At first instance, Deputy Judge John Randall QC allowed the proprietary estoppel claim to 
succeed.12  He was satisfied that, given Peter’s characteristics, his actions in 1990 could amount 
to an assurance that David would inherit the farm, and that his later actions reinforced a mutual 
understanding between them.  Reliance was established by David’s passing up the other 
employment opportunities, and substantial detriment was incurred by David’s unpaid work after 
1990.  Taking a holistic view, the judge found that Peter’s conscience was sufficiently affected to 
justify the intervention of equity.  The judge decided that the appropriate remedy would be to 
transfer to David the farm land and all the agricultural assets in the estate.  This effectively 
satisfied his expectation. 
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The Court of Appeal’s approach 
 
Writing in an earlier issue, Martin Dixon considered Deputy Judge Randall’s decision to be 
‘neither unexpected nor likely to be overturned on appeal’.13  Nevertheless, Peter’s personal 
representatives, comprising two of his sisters and his niece, successfully challenged the decision 
in the Court of Appeal.  Lloyd LJ, giving the only substantive judgment, recognised that the 
matter ‘turned on whether Peter's act in handing over the Bonus Notice [was] sufficient to 
amount to a promise, representation or assurance which can be the basis of a proprietary estoppel 
claim.’14  He concluded that it was not. 
 
Representations in the Testamentary Context 
 
Lloyd LJ began by analysing the history of using estoppel to enforce testamentary promises, 
something that had occurred ‘only in the last 20 years or so’.15  He noted that the realm of 
testamentary dispositions presents particular problems as compared to the classic estoppel 
scenario involving a property owner standing by while the claimant incurs expenditure on the 
land in the belief that he has an interest in it.16 He was especially concerned by the popular 
misconceptions surrounding succession law.  In a testamentary case, according to Lloyd LJ, it is 
necessary to distinguish a statement of current testamentary intention, which could be a mere 
statement of fact and should not be relied upon, from a promise or representation as to what the 
property owner is going to do by will, which could found an estoppel claim.  
While Deputy Judge Randall had emphasised that an expectation could be created in a 
wide range of circumstances, and focused on the requirement of a broad enquiry into the factual 
matrix, Lloyd LJ was conscious of the need for caution in the testamentary sphere.  Of course, he 
was correct to say that a greater range of possible meanings could be attached to statements 
regarding testamentary dispositions.   Nevertheless, he may have been too quick to treat 
testamentary cases differently, and this will be a key issue for the House of Lords to resolve. 
  Lloyd LJ went on to express the view that a representation in the testamentary context 
must be ‘clear and unequivocal’, while refusing to rule out that a representation could be made 
through conduct alone.17  He also said that the representation must in general be intended to be 
relied upon before it can generate an estoppel, or at least be ‘reasonably taken’ as so intended.18  
Perhaps unfortunately, the ‘reasonableness’ qualification is less obvious from some of Lloyd 
LJ’s later formulations of the rule, probably for the sake of conciseness.  
Lloyd LJ admitted that intention for a representation to be relied upon was not often 
expressed as a requirement, but explained this on the basis that in most cases it was either taken 
for granted or obvious on the facts.  He showed that the representations in all but two of the 
previous testamentary authorities were in fact intended to be relied upon, in the sense of being 
aimed at influencing the specific behaviour of the claimant or addressing his or her ‘question, 
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request or complaint’.19  In the exceptional cases, Ottey v Grundy20 and Campbell v Griffin,21 the 
assurances were ‘express, clear and sincere’.22  This, on Lloyd LJ’s analysis, was sufficient to 
commit the representor to his representations even if they were unprompted.  
 Lloyd LJ hoped that this would address some of the criticisms of Gillett v Holt, which led 
Gray and Gray to write of a ‘deep ambivalence’ towards the revocability of a testamentary 
promise.23  He emphasised that the Court of Appeal could not say in general how formal a 
promise had to be before it was considered irrevocable.  Nevertheless, if it a statement was found 
to be intended to be relied upon, or could reasonably be taken as so intended, it should be 
considered irrevocable (provided the other requirements for proprietary estoppel are satisfied).   
If it was not, it should be considered a mere statement of fact and therefore revocable.  This was 
an admirable attempt to clarify the law, but the precise meaning of intent for a statement to be 
relied upon is not easy to extract from the judgment. 
 
The Application of the Principles to the Facts 
 
At first instance the judge described the handing over of the policy documents as ‘something of a 
watershed’, transforming David’s hope of inheriting into an expectation.24  Given Peter’s 
characteristics as a private individual, Deputy Judge Randall was willing to accept that he was 
signalling his intention that David should succeed him at the farm.  The judge also held that the 
indirect remarks made to David encouraged this expectation, since Peter had discussed matters 
that ‘it was only necessary to communicate to someone who would be there after Peter had 
gone.’25  
Lloyd LJ was unconvinced.  On his more objective and arguably harsher analysis, ‘Peter 
never said anything to David which…amounted to a statement, still less a promise, that David 
would inherit the farm’.26  In his view, the ‘unspoken mutual understanding’ recognised by the 
judge was not enough,27 and even the 1990 event gave rise ‘at most to implication and 
inference’.28  In spite of the judge’s finding that Peter had intended to indicate that David would 
inherit the farm, it was decisive that there was no ‘express statement whose meaning and effect 
can be examined’, as there had been in the previous authorities.29  While Lloyd LJ thought it 
unsurprising that Peter should regard David as the ‘most suitable inheritor’ of the farm, he was 
equally unsurprised that ‘he should say or do things consistent with his holding that opinion’.30  
Allowing for Peter’s characteristics and holding that those words and actions could constitute a 
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representation, it seems, would have diluted the requirement that a representation is clear and 
unequivocal and introduced an unacceptable degree of subjectivity to the analysis.   
Even if there had been a sufficiently clear representation, it may have been a challenge to 
prove that it was intended to be relied upon.  Nevertheless, given the circumstances, it is 
arguable that it would have been reasonable for David to take it as so intended.  For his part, 
Lloyd LJ noted that the judge had not directly addressed this question.  In considering what 
Deputy Judge Randall’s conclusion might have been if he had done so, Lloyd LJ placed a high 
degree of weight on the fact that Peter knew nothing of the opportunities that David had passed 
up.  Lloyd LJ decided that the 1990 statement was, ‘at most, a statement of present intention’ to 
which Peter was not committed, even if he maintained that intention in fact.32  It was therefore 
unreasonable, in the view of the Court of Appeal, for David to rely upon it without further 
enquiry. 
In justifying his conclusion on the representation, Lloyd LJ emphasised that because of 
the ‘potential and inevitable fluidity and flexibility of proprietary estoppel, as a doctrine of 
equity based on conscience’, the requirements of proprietary estoppel had to be ‘applied with a 
certain degree of rigour of analysis’.33  He was particularly concerned that a proprietary estoppel 
claimant could be in a stronger position than a beneficiary under a will given the revocability of 
the will.  Dixon opines that the requirement of an express representation is simply ‘to substitute 
one kind of formality for another’.34 There is certainly force in this argument, and Lloyd LJ’s 
judgment is unduly objective in its focus.  Nevertheless, one can sympathise with his 
anxiousness that there be at least one clear criterion for the operation of estoppel, rather than 
setting too much store by the more nebulous concept of unconscionability, even if it is ‘key that 
unlocks the door’ to a remedy.35 
 
The Irrelevance of Mere Intention 
 
Lloyd LJ admitted that Peter probably intended to leave the farm to David until the time of his 
death, particularly given the likelihood that he destroyed his will only in order to prevent one of 
the other beneficiaries, with whom he had fallen out, from sharing in his estate.  Mere intention, 
however, was not enough to generate an estoppel, and could not compensate for the lack of a 
clear representation.  Consistently with Gillett v Holt, the claim had to be ‘made out sufficiently 
clearly and reliably to prevail even if the landowner has changed his mind, for good or bad 
reason’,36 and was therefore ‘independent of Peter’s ultimate intentions’.37   
Given the importance attached to a clear representation by Lloyd LJ, this conclusion 
stands to reason.  The unconscionability that justifies the equitable intervention must stem from 
the conduct of the property owner in making a representation and failing to honour it, by 
accident or design, rather than from the operation of the formality requirements themselves.  
While the fact that Peter intended David to inherit the farm increases the likelihood that he made 
a relevant representation and adds to the perceived unfairness of the result, it does not justify the 
operation of estoppel if no such representation can be found. 
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Deputy Judge Randall had been prepared to accept that the handing over of the documents 
‘strongly encouraged’ or ‘was a powerful factor in causing’ David to stay at the farm.38  The 
judge rejected the suggestion that David was motivated solely by the need to look after his own 
parents, since one of his brothers would have been able to do so.  Lloyd LJ found it difficult to 
decide whether the reliance requirement had been satisfied, for understandable reasons.  Given 
that the test for reliance is to ask what the claimant would have done had the representation been 
withdrawn, it is not easy to perform the test if one does not think that a representation was made 
in the first place. 
 There was no doubt in the minds of either Deputy Judge Randall or Lloyd LJ that David 
had incurred detriment through the unpaid work that he performed for so many years.  Lloyd LJ, 
for example, recognised that David ‘devoted long hours altogether selflessly to Peter’.39  
Inevitably, however, the sheer extent of the sacrifice made does not of itself justify the success of 
a proprietary claim, and David’s claim had failed long before the full extent of his detriment 




Deputy Judge Randall had held that, as a result of the ‘remarkable’ level of commitment he 
demonstrated, David had a ‘compelling case’ for the fulfilment of his expectation.40  He decided 
that it would be neither disproportionate nor unjust for that expectation to be satisfied, even 
given the ‘minimum equity’ approach necessitated by Jennings v Rice.41  The judge had imposed 
some limits, however.  There was a suggestion that David’s expectation at times extended to the 
entire estate, but Deputy Judge Randall held that to award the whole estate to David would have 
been disproportionate even if his expectation had so extended.   
Since David’s claim had failed, the Court of Appeal considered it unnecessary to address 
the remedy.  Extra-judicially, Lord Walker has expressed doubts about the propriety of the 
dichotomy he introduced in Jennings v Rice, comprising ‘bargain’ and ‘non-bargain’ cases, 
suggesting that the principles governing the exercise of the remedial discretion are ripe for re-
examination.42  Given that no estoppel was found, Thorner v Curtis was hardly the place for this 




Thorner v Curtis is a hard case, and the Court of Appeal’s judgment is a complex one.  Few will 
fail to be sympathetic towards David Thorner, and Lloyd LJ himself admitted that he had a 
‘strong moral claim’ to inherit Steart Farm.43  Lloyd LJ could be criticised for over-concentrating 
on the representation requirement at the expense of his duty to consider the matter in the round.  
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At the very least, it is notable that he gave little weight to the judge’s findings on the subjective 
intentions and characteristics of the parties when searching for a representation.  That said, even 
if it survives Cobbe largely intact, proprietary estoppel is unlikely to be an appropriate 
mechanism by which to provide a general quantum meruit-based remedy for unpaid work.  
Moreover, as confirmed by Thorner, the doctrine is not always able to give effect to the 
intentions of a property owner when he has failed to comply with formality requirements, even in 
the face of considerable detriment on the part of the claimant, since otherwise those requirements 
would be undermined.  Of course, we have not heard the end of the matter, and it is hoped that 
proprietary estoppel’s most recent visit to the House of Lords. (this time in ‘testamentary’ guise) 
will be of assistance.  A claim under the doctrine may require a clear representation, but the basis 
of proprietary estoppel itself is equally in need of clarification.  
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